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1960 candidates before TV cameras: In Nixon's view, "a program . . . the majority . . . wanted to see"

elected, I will represent all the people."

Both Adams and Dr. Rodgers face tough opposition in their primary fights, and no one in Anniston gives either one of them much chance of winning.

"And so far, it's been awfully quiet," said Police Chief J.L. Peek. "I don't expect we're going to have any trouble."

PEOPLE:

Nixon's Crises

"The easiest period in a crisis is actually the battle itself. The most difficult is the period of indecision—whether to fight or run away. And the most dangerous period is the aftermath . . ." In such an aftermath—the work-filled year since his defeat for the Presidency in 1960—Richard Nixon wrote these revealing words as part of an introduction to a revealing book on his spectacular political career.

At 47, midpoint in the careers of most men, the former Vice President soberly and painstakingly has set down the high points of his journey from Whittier, Calif., to Washington, D.C., in a memoir, "Six Crises," to be released March 29 by Doubleday & Co. (but already on sale in bookstores). The almost certainly best-selling book (460 pages, \$5.95) presents these glimpses of a complex, emotional, dedicated man, deeply involved in what he now considers the six climaxes of his public life.

►On the case of Alger Hiss: ". . . I suppose there may be a grain of truth in both of the observations that . . . had it not been for the Hiss case, I might have been President of the United States . . . Equally: Had it not been for the Hiss case, I might never have been Vice President of the United States and thus a candidate for President."

►On the "secret" campaign fund and university: When a heckler yelled: "Tell us

about the \$16,000 [the amount in the fund that led some Republican leaders to advise Nixon to resign from the Eisenhower ticket in 1952] . . . Instinctively I knew I had to counterattack . . . I let him have it: 'When I received the nomination for the Vice Presidency I was warned that if I continued to attack the Communists in this government they would continue to smear me . . .'"

►On Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack: "Certainly I had no desire or intention to seize an iota of Presidential power. I was the Vice President and could be nothing more . . . My problem, what I had to do, was to provide leadership without appearing to lead."

►On the anti-U.S. mobs in Caracas: "After Caracas, when those charged with responsibility for our Latin American policy in the State Department tried to get proper treatment for their proposals, they could and usually did point to what happened in Caracas and Lima as a warning that we could no longer get by with fancy words . . ."

►Debate with Khrushchev in 1959: "To some, it may have looked as though we had both lost our tempers. But exactly the opposite was true. I had full and complete control of my temper and was aware of it . . . Khrushchev never loses his temper—he uses it."

►On the 1960 election: "It was not that I believed I should accept defeat with resignation. I have never had much sympathy for the point of view, 'It isn't whether you win or lose that counts, but how you play the game.' How you play the game does count. But one must put top consideration on the will, the desire, and the determination to win."

Virtually everyone knows the external facts of all these crises, of course. What Nixon adds to the public records are his own personal embellishments—plus a unique insight into Richard Nixon himself, and his own emotions during

these trying and crucial encounters.

Speaking on the 1960 campaign, for example, Nixon vehemently denies that he lost because he ran a "me-too" campaign. "On the issues," he says, "I drew the line between us coldly and clearly and could not have hit him harder than I did, with any sense of responsibility."

Actually, Nixon's drive for the Presidency was not a single crisis but a long series of problems—the secret meeting with Rockefeller; Nixon's defeat by John Kennedy in the first television debate; Nixon's long, dogged struggle to come back; the breath-takingly close election itself (out of 68,838,003 votes, a difference of 418,530 in the popular vote), and finally the dilemma of whether to challenge the Kennedy election on the ground of voting fraud.

Nixon charges that Mr. Kennedy, after a pre-election briefing by Allen Dulles, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on how the U.S. was training Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro, then proceeded to come out publicly for such training. Nixon says:

"Kennedy, with full knowledge of the facts, was jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign-policy operation" for political purposes. Nixon, who was bound by security from saying that he had helped create that policy, is convinced that what appeared to be his "soft" stand on Fidel Castro cost him many votes.

►Religious Issue: Nixon also blames Robert F. Kennedy, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United Automobile Workers, and others for keeping the religious issue "squarely in the center of the campaign . . . They were, in short, contributing all they could to make religion an issue while piously insisting that to do so was evidence of bigotry."

In "Six Crises," Nixon also writes that when he was Attorney General, William Rogers tried to persuade the White

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House to intercede in behalf of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Negro desegregation leader who was arrested in Atlanta and imprisoned, but the White House turned down his request.

Later in the campaign, when the TV debates began, Nixon writes he knew that Kennedy had more to gain from them. But Nixon felt that he could not open himself "to the charge that I was afraid to defend the Administration's and my own record. Even more important, I would be declining to participate in a program which the majority of the American people, regardless of party, wanted to see."


The crisis of the campaign carried past election day—as Republicans began to charge Democrats with voting frauds in Illinois and Texas. Some of Nixon's closest advisers insisted he demand a recount. But Nixon found that it would take eighteen months to get a recount in Illinois's Cook County (Chicago), and there simply was no way to force a recount in Texas.

Recount: Finally, Nixon refused to challenge the election because of "several overriding considerations." He writes: "If I were to demand a recount, the organization of the new Administration and the orderly transfer of responsibility from the old to the new might be delayed for months. The situation within the entire Federal government would be chaotic . . . Then too, the bitterness that would be engendered by such a maneuver on my part would, in my opinion, have done incalculable . . . damage throughout the country . . ."

The Nixon book is candid—perhaps more candid than the former Vice President realizes. Under the burden of great decisions, Nixon confesses he becomes moody, angry, sleepless. Nixon shows himself to be at once a humble and proud man, with a deep sense of duty to his country. He has a passion for careful preparation, and a broadcaster's faith in opinion ratings.

It also emerges that his wife, Pat, is the rock of the Nixon family. She was at least as cool as he when she was in danger of being killed during the South American riots. During the fund crisis, Nixon wanted to resign. Pat told him: "If you, in the face of attack, do not fight back but simply crawl away, you will destroy yourself." Three minutes before he was to face the television cameras for the famous "Checkers speech," Nixon told his wife he didn't think he could go through with it. Pat insisted: "Of course you can."

All in all, "Six Crises" is an enlightening account of the stormy life of a sincere man undergoing the stresses and strains of cold-war and red-hot politics. It is the story of a man who fought hard—if not always successfully—for what he believed.



Breakfast, lunch, dinner—brunch, tea, cocktails . . .

No. 1 Problem in Politics— Paying Those Campaign Bills

One recent evening in Miami Beach, Fla., the President of the United States underwent an all-too-familiar ordeal. Sitting down to a \$100-a-plate roast-beef dinner, he imperturbably suffered the minor indignities of listening to endless political oratory, inhaling smoke-laden atmosphere, eating the indifferent cuisine, and grappling with the outhurst menus of autograph-seekers.

It was worth it. Mr. Kennedy may have suffered an acute attack of boredom, if not indigestion, but the Democratic Party treasury had been enriched by \$340,000. And not even a President, with all his problems, is exempt from contributing his share toward meeting the high cost of politics, which, like almost everything else, has been rising sharply in recent years.

The price tag now, in fact, is staggering. In 1961, an election off-year, the Democratic Party reported that it spent \$4.2 million—three times as much as the previous non-election-year high of \$1.3 million in 1959; and the Republican Party listed expenditures of \$3.1 million, also a record. During the Presidential year of 1960, the bill for all political spending reached an estimated \$175 million. After the bills were totted up for 1960's local, state, and national election, the Democrats found they owed a cool \$4.5 million—ranging from \$2.04 for a rubber stamp to \$500,000 for air-travel expenses. When Democratic Party treasurer Matt McCloskey, a Philadelphia contractor, reported the tab, the President said: "My God, what would we have done if we lost?" "Where do you get that *we* stuff?" cracked McCloskey. "I had a one-way ticket to Europe." On the Republican side, the election bill, says Finance Committee chairman Courtney Burton of Cleveland, was \$750,000.

High political costs are universal—and growing all the time. In California, for

Edmund G. Brown and Richard Nixon will spend close to \$1.5 million each before November election day. In New York or Pennsylvania, a statewide candidate for governor or the U.S. Senate must spend at least \$1 million. In New York City, Republican Louis J. Lefkowitz spent close to \$1 million in his futile race for mayor last fall. In most two-party states, a Congressional race usually costs \$25,000 for the incumbent; \$50,000 for the lesser-known challenger.

Factors: The big bill, generally, is due to increased costs of television, advertising, travel, accommodations, printing, supplies, staff salaries, telephones, telegraph, and the latest essential for the well-appointed candidate, the private political poll. The biggest-ticket item these days is television. "You can't reach



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